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Abstract 
 
     The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic benefits of country of origin labeling 
(COOL) regulation by estimating the consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for Taiwan products 
vs. other imported products if clearly labeled with their countries of origin. We employ the 
Vickrey second-price sealed bid auction and conducted auctions in three major cities in Taiwan in 
2009. Charcoal-smoked plums from Taiwan and China and oolong teas from Taiwan, China, and 
Vietnam are auctioned products. One important feature of our experimental design is to 
investigate the impacts of product tasting on bidding behavior. We estimated Tobit bid models 
and the OLS premium functions. The regression results show that product tasting affected the 
participants’ WTP positively or negatively depending on products. Specifically, tasting raised 
bids for Taiwan and China teas, but lowered bids for Vietnam tea. The econometric results show 
very high premiums for Taiwan products, ranging from 83% to 109% for tea and 55% to 66% for 
charcoal-smoked plum. These findings clearly show strong preference of Taiwanese consumers 
over food and agricultural products produced domestically. It is very important to have rigorous 
COOL regulation in Taiwan. If all foods and agricultural products are clearly labeled with their 
countries of origin, Taiwanese consumers and food producers stand to benefit greatly with COOL. 
The COOL would be one of the best instruments to reduce the negative impacts of agricultural 
trade liberalization under WTO or ECFA. 
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Introduction 
 The objective of this study is to evaluate the economic benefit of enforcing the country 
of origin labeling (COOL) regulation for food products in Taiwan. Specifically we use an 
auction experiment to quantify the willingness to pay (WTP) for food products produced in 
Taiwan vs. those imported from other countries. Our experimental auction design includes a 
special feature on product tasting. The study is motivated by two observations. First, many 
agricultural products imported or smuggled from China and other Southeast Asian countries 
are sold as though they are locally produced in Taiwan. For example, more than 70% of 
preserved fruits consumed in Taiwan are imported from other countries. Unfortunately most 
of retailers would never mention truthfully the country of origin for the products from China 
and other Southeast Asian countries. In the case of oolong teas imported from China and 
Vietnam, they are sold almost entirely with the name of Taiwan oolong tea in the market 
place. Merchants of those imported products gain unfair profits from not telling the consumer 
about the country of origin. Consumers are, of course, the losers in this market situation 
because they purchase fake products and in many cases they are harmful products. One 
reason why many consumers would not purchase agricultural products from China and other 
Southeast Asian countries is due to food safety concerns. The China milk power (melamine) 
scare happened in September 2008 has instilled fear in consuming foods from China.  
The second observation is that Taiwanese consumers have reached the same level as 
those in Japan, Australia and the United States with a strong preference for food products 
produced domestically. Therefore, the economic benefits from COOL can be expected for 
domestically produced food products. But the question is how much the benefit would be? 
 The COOL is one approach to eliminate the asymmetry of information between the 
sellers and buyers of food products. This is particularly important due to the growing 
concerns on food safety. Knowing the true country of origin for food products, the consumer 
can decide on whether or not to purchase without such uncertainty. In order to protect the 
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consumer, many developed countries have enforced mandatory COOL regulation. Japan has 
one of the most comprehensive COOL regulations, covering both fresh and processed food 
products. Japanese government requires for domestically produced products, particularly sea 
food products to label the place of origin as well. In addition, for processed products, the 
COOL is also required for the main ingredients used in the processed foods. The United 
States enacted its first mandatory COOL in the 2002 Farm Bill and began enforcing its COOL 
law for sea food products in 2005. By September, 2008, all meats, fresh and frozen fruits and 
vegetables had to have COOL. Today, if you go to the supermarkets in the U.S., Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand, you will find all fresh fruits and vegetables have clear and visible 
country of origin labels. All the meats and seafood products are packed with a clear COOL as 
well.  
In Taiwan, the government enacted the first COOL regulation for packaged foods in 
January 2008. However, this requirement is waived if the package label already contains the 
manufacturer’s address which shows sufficient information on the country of origin. This 
COOL regulation was further expanded to cover the imported bulk food products in 2010. 
There seems not much enforcement to these COOL laws in Taiwan as no cases of violation 
have been reported. The consumer still does not know the country of origin for many 
products they purchase in Taiwan. This study attempts to demonstrate that Taiwanese 
consumers incur economic loss if the government’s COOL regulation goes without strict 
enforcement. The results from this study would provide tangible estimates of the economic 
benefits from forcefully implementing the COOL regulation in Taiwan. 
 
Literature Review 
 Since the legislation of the COOL regulation in the 2002 Farm Bill in the U.S., there 
have been several studies on the impacts of the mandatory COOL on consumers and 
producers of various agricultural products. Earlier Schupp and Gillespie (2001) conducted a 
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telephone survey of food handlers and restaurants to investigate the consumer’s attitude 
toward COOL. Their results show that 80% of respondents supported a mandatory COOL, 
but there was no indication about whether consumers were willing to pay for the additional 
cost. Loureiro and Umberger (2003) used data from a survey on the COOL for beef of food 
shoppers in grocery stores in Colorado, United States. Using a five-point Likert scale, they 
found that the most important attributes for beef are freshness (4.74), food safety (4.61), and 
high quality (4.4). Their Logit model showed that consumers were willing to pay an average 
of 38% and 58% premium for the “U.S. Certified Steak” and “U.S. Certified Hamburger,” 
respectively, over those without the COOL.  
Umberger et al. (2003) used a forth-price sealed bid auction experiment and a contingent 
valuation (CV) survey to estimate the WTP premiums for steaks with COOL. Their results 
show that the U.S. consumers were willing to pay a 19% premium for the steak labeled with 
“USA guaranteed, born and raised in the U.S.” compared with those without COOL which 
was higher than the 11% premium estimated from the CV data. There was particular attention 
on meat products in the U.S. because of the debates on American consumers’ preferences on 
domestic vs. imported meats, especially beef before the Congress passed the law to 
implement COOL for meat products in 2007.  
The COOL not only affects the consumer, but also the supply side. The implementation 
of COOL requires a rigorous traceability system of food products through the entire 
marketing channel. This requires record keeping and auditing which would incur additional 
costs. The Agricultural Marketing Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated 
the record-keeping costs for all the affected sectors associated with COOL to be about $2 
billion (in U.S. dollars). VanSickle et al. (2003) argued that mandatory record-keeping at the 
producer level is not required and estimated the costs for record keeping for the rest of the 
supply chain to be between $70 to $193 million (in U.S. dollars). Hayes and Meyer (2003) 
estimated the cost of implementing COOL for the U.S. pork industry to be just over $1 billion 
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(in U.S. dollars), based on the trace-back systems used in the European Union. Focusing on 
the impacts of COOL on producers, Brester et al. (2004) found that with COOL, the retail 
prices of the U.S. produced beef and pork would increase by 4.05% and 4.45%, respectively. 
Lusk and Anderson (2004) took the cost of COOL into account and analyzed its impact on 
producer and consumer welfare. Because of substitution effect, the poultry sector in the U.S. 
which COOL requirements are not applied to will be the only beneficiary if the producers of 
meat products have to bear half or more of the cost. However, the COOL would likely raise 
the demand for domestic products due to consumer preference. Their results show that an 
increase in aggregate consumer demand of 2% to 3% for American beef and pork is likely 
sufficient to offset any lost producer welfare due to the increased COOL costs.  
 Implementation of COOL regulation in one country may affect the demand and supply 
situations in another country. In a study conducted in Canada, Rude et al. (2006) showed that 
COOL will do little to help U.S. consumers, producers or processors. This is because U.S. 
packers are unlikely to slaughter pigs of Canadian origin due to segregation costs. However, 
Canadian producers stand to suffer significant losses under COOL, but Canadian consumers 
gain modest benefits through lower pork prices. Of course, under any public policy such as 
COOL, there are likely losers and winners. In the case of Canadian pork, there may not be 
strong preference for American pork over Canadian pork by U.S. consumers. Therefore, there 
will not be significant gains for American consumers under COOL. However, the situation is 
different in Taiwan where the preference differential between domestically produced food 
products and those imported form China and other Southeast Asian countries is apparent. Our 
study will not address the supply side or cost issues. However, the high price premiums for 
Taiwan produced products demonstrated in this study would make the resulting cost increase 
relatively trivial. 
This study employs an auction experiment to estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) 
premiums for food products produced in Taiwan vs. those imported from other countries. As 
  6
mentioned before, since many imported food products have been sold in Taiwan as though 
they were domestically produced, the clearly labeled products with COOL are not available 
in the market place. Thus we have to use the methods of valuation similar to those used for 
non-market goods. Food safety is a non-market good because you can not purchase food 
safety alone. Labeling for country of origin (COOL) or genetically modified (GM) foods is 
related to food safety. The two most widely used methods for valuating the economic benefits 
of food safety is contingent valuation method (CVM) and auction experiment. The CVM is 
based on hypothetical market created in a consumer survey questionnaire (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989; Habb and McConnell, 2002). It has the advantage of collecting a large 
representative sample, but has been criticized for the likelihood of overestimation of WTP 
resulting from hypothetical bias. Auction experiment has gained its popularity in recent years 
as an alternative to the CVM in non-market good valuation. The most widely recognized 
advantage of the auction experiment is its close resemblance of a real market, rather than a 
hypothetical market. With auction, the winner of the auction has to buy the auctioned goods 
in the experiment. This method has been widely applied to the valuation of genetically 
modified (GM) foods (Huffman et al., 2003) and quality differentiated products (Umberger 
and Feuz, 2004).  
There are several auction mechanisms used for experimental auctions (Lusk and 
Shogren, 2007). The most popular method is the Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auction. 
Vickrey (1961) suggested this method since it is easy to implement and it is a weakly 
dominant strategy for the participants to reveal their true valuations. Under this method, the 
highest bidder wins the product, but pays only the second highest bid. It has been shown that 
using this second-price auction, there is absolutely no advantage to bid anything other than 
your true WTP value. However, it has been observed that in the second-price auction, low 
bidders may feel inconsequential and thus become non-participatory bidders. Therefore the 
low bidders may not care about how they bid, affecting the accuracy of the auction results. In 
  7
order to correct this problem, the uses of 4th price, fifth price and nth price auction have been 
suggested (Shogren et al., 2001, Hoffman et al., 1993). These auction formats are of course 
more cumbersome to conduct and sometimes create confusion among the participants. Note 
that this study focuses on the impact of tasting in our experimental design. The tasting not 
only adds complexity in the design of experiment, but also requires additional time in the 
experiment. Therefore, we adopt the Vickrey’s second-price sealed-bid auction for this study. 
Another important issue for doing auction experiment is about the repeated trials. 
Researchers often conducted repeated trials with one binding trial chosen randomly after all 
trials completed. With repeated trials one can gain additional observations. Since the sample 
size is often small relative to other CV surveys, we can attain more samples from repeating 
several rounds of auction in the experiment. The usual justification is for participants to 
receive market experience in order to understand that sincere bidding is a weakly dominant 
strategy (Coppinger et al., 1980) and to gain familiarity for valuating unfamiliar products 
(Shogren et al., 2000). Furthermore, we often announce auction results such as the ID of the 
highest bidder and the second highest bid after each trial. This practice helps participants to 
form a more accurate bidding price for the auctioned product.  List and Shogren (1999) 
found that posting second price had some effect on bidding prices but by a small percentage 
and it does not affect the behavior of experienced bidders or the bidders of familiar products. 
They further found that anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. Corrigan and 
Rousu (2006) found that there exits affiliation between trials when posting second price in 
each trial. Thus, they recommend valuation of bid premium to be more accurate than WTP. 
We adopt the use of repeated trials because there is no decisive evidence that repeated trials 
are not consistent with the demand revealing property. 
 
Experimental Auction Design 
 A sound experimental auction design is extremely important for the success of an 
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auction experiment. This task includes product choice, selection of auction mechanism, 
design of the step-by-step auction instruction, and development of survey questionnaire to 
collect important information about personal and demographic data, the participant’s food 
purchasing behavior and risk perception. Since this study focuses on the impact of product 
tasting, it is important to develop a procedure on how and when to offer tasting during the 
experiment. Also it is important to decide on the locations of the experiment and how to 
recruit participants.  
 First task is about product choice. We selected two products for the experiment: 
charcoal-smoked plum and oolong tea. The reason for choosing these products was because 
of the recognition by Taiwanese consumers about the common practice of selling the 
imported preserved fruits and tea as Taiwan products in the market place over the years. We 
conducted a search on the United Daily News databank and found that there were 87 news 
articles reporting contaminated tea from Vietnam during January 2005 to August 2008. Much 
of these Vietnam teas actually came from China. Note that one important attribute for the 
auctioned product originated from different countries is that they have to look very similar. If 
they do not look alike, then it would be difficult to separate the effect of COOL on WTP from 
other product attributes such as color or shape. We used charcoal-smoked plums from Taiwan 
and China because they looked very similar. Due to time constraint, we dropped candy bar 
auction as a learning session in this experiment. 
We maintain one very important principle for conducting auction experiment and that is 
we must use authentic products unlike other studies which used fake products. It would be 
unethical to auction the same product and then lie to the participants by labeling it with 
Taiwan and China untruthfully. We run into some difficulty to obtain plum and tea from 
China and Vietnam because almost all merchants would not admit that their stores sell plum 
or any other preserved fruits from China or oolong tea from China or Vietnam. With efforts 
and persuasion, we were able to convince one wholesaler of preserved fruits and one tea 
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retailer to help us obtain the authentic products. They claimed that they asked friends from 
other stores to provide these products.  
Note also that tea is a relatively expensive good. The extremely good oolong tea may 
cost several thousands of New Taiwan (NT) dollars per Gin (600 grams) a unit used for 
purchasing food products in Taiwan. In order to prevent the situation of insufficient budget 
for participants, we auctioned both plums and teas for only 150 grams or 1/4 Gin. Since 
participants were given $1,000 (in NT dollars, or equivalently US$32), they would have 
ample budget to bid on the auctioned goods.   
  Regarding the choice of auction mechanism, we conducted preliminary experiments 
to compare the second price and the 5th price auctions, using student subjects from the 
National Chung Cheng University. These experiments showed very similar results. Therefore, 
we decided to use the second- price sealed-bid auction for this study.  
Our next design task is about the repeated trials and product tasting. In order to provide 
participants with learning experience, we decided to have three trials of auction before 
product tasting and another three trials after tasting. We auctioned two products in the same 
experiment. In order to avoid telling people before hand about tasting, we first had three trials 
for charcoal smoked plum and then auctioned oolong tea for three trials. Then we had 
participants tasting the three oolong teas. After tasting, we had three trials of tea auction. 
Then we let participants tasting two plums and finishing the last three trials of plum auction. 
In this way, participants would not know there will be product tasting during the first three 
trials for both plum and tea. 
In order to gain representativeness of this study, we conducted our experiments in three 
major cities in Taiwan: Taipei, Taichung and Kaoshiung. Due to research budget constraint, 
we recruited only 40 participants in each city. Two sessions were conducted in each location. 
Since after each auction we had to manually collect the bidding cards and sort out all the bids 
from the highest to the lowest, it was time-consuming. Therefore, 20 participants in each 
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session seemed an optimal number. For recruiting, we posted the advertisement in many 
websites including the most visited BBS and other job search websites. In the advertisement, 
we indicated the date/time of the auction, and the number of participants in each categories 
specified by sex, age and education level according to Taiwan’s recent demographic data 
(Ministry of Interior, Taiwan, 2009).  Of course, those who saw the advertisement were 
young internet users and mostly ineligible for our experiment. However, they recruited for us 
their family and friends.  Even though our sample is not truly random, but they reflect the 
current population mix. With $1,000 cash payment, there were many people registered for the 
experiments. In fact we selected 40 persons from 121 registered for Taipei sessions, 142 
persons for Taichung sessions and 208 for Kaoshiung sessions, representing acceptance rates 
of 33%, 28% and 19.2 %, respectively. 
 The final section of the instruction is a questionnaire to collect data on the 
participant’s food purchasing behavior, risk perception, food safety concerns, personal and 
demographic data. For example in the questionnaire, we asked participants to rank the 
relative importance between freshness and safety, between price and safety and between price 
and COOL when doing food purchase. The complete instruction for our auction experiment is 
available upon request. 
 
Auction Results 
The auction was conducted first in Taipei on February 27, 2009, then in Taichung on 
March 9 and Kaoshiung on March 13. Before these sessions, we also conducted a test auction 
at National Chung Cheng University for the focus group of nine food shoppers (not students) 
on February 25, 2009. Furthermore, we also conducted six sessions of the auction of candy 
bars and charcoal-smoked plums with student subjects in December 2008. In this study we 
used only the data collected from the public auctions. We had totally 116 participated in the 
sample from public auctions. 
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Table 1 shows average bids by trial before and after tasting for charcoal-smoked plums 
from Taiwan and China. Note that we told the participants about where these plums came 
from in the beginning of the auction. Therefore, Trials 1-3 reflect the participant’s valuation 
of their WTP knowing the country of origin while Trials 4-6 reflect their valuations after they 
had a chance to taste the products. Clearly the participants valued Taiwan plum higher than 
China plum as the average bid was $ 52.16 per 150 grams for Taiwan plum and $ 29.78 for 
China plum before tasting. Interestingly after tasting, the average bid for China plum 
increased to $41.32 while the average bid for Taiwan plum also increased to $58.9. Before 
tasting, the bid premium for Taiwan plum over China plum was $22.38 while after tasting, 
this premium reduced to $17.58. Clearly Taiwan plum was much preferred by the participants 
over China plum. Furthermore, product tasting did affect the participants’ valuation of their 
WTP.  
It was noted that China plum tasted more juicy than Taiwan plum. As part of the 
questionnaire, we asked participants about what kind of plum they like after tasting. With 
total sample, 47% liked Taiwan plum the best, 45% liked China plum, 7% indicated no 
difference between the two while 1% giving no opinion. Despite many participants liked the 
taste of China’s plum, they still had lower WTP for China’s plum than Taiwan plum. One 
may wonder whether the posting of second price have affected the bidding behavior. This 
hypothesis will be formally tested later. But if we just use the bidding results from the first 
trial, the average premium for Taiwan plum was calculated to be $22.03 which is very close 
to the estimate of $22.38 from the first three trials.  
Table 2 presents the average bids by trial and country before and after tasting for oolong 
tea. Before tasting, the average bids are $209, 113 and 111 for oolong teas from Taiwan, 
China and Vietnam, respectively. Taiwan tea’s premiums are $96 and $98 (or 85% and 88%), 
respectively over China and Vietnam tea. After tasting, the average bids increased to $237 
and $133 for Taiwan and China tea, respectively, but decreased slightly to $110 for Vietnam 
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tea. These results show that the bid premiums for Taiwan tea decreased to $90 from $96 over 
China tea, but increased to $113 over Vietnam tea after tasting. These findings indicate that 
tasting did affect participants’ WTP for various teas, but not as dramatic as the case for 
charcoal-smoked plums. In the experiment, we asked respondents what kind of tea they liked 
the best after tasting. The responses show that 72% of the participants liked Taiwan tea the 
best, 21% liked China tea, 3% liked Vietnam tea the best, 3% saying no differences among 
the three, and 1% giving no opinion. Therefore, tasting raised the bids for Taiwan and China 
teas, but lowering the bids for Vietnam tea.  
Overall, these auction results clearly show stronger preferences by Taiwanese consumers 
for Taiwan oolong tea over those from China or Vietnam. This finding is further substantiated 
by the number of zero bids. For the first trial, 26.7% of participants bid zero for China plum 
and only 2.6% did the same for Taiwan plum. After tasting the percentage of zero bids for 
China plum decreased to 14% and for Taiwan plum the percentage increased to 5% after 
tasting. Still, the number of participants who did not want to pay anything for China plum 
was much higher than those for Taiwan plum. In the case of oolong tea, the percentages of 
zero bids in the first trial were 2.6%, 16%, and 11% for Taiwan, China and Vietnam, 
respectively. After tasting, these percentages changed to 0.9%, 10% and 9%, respectively for 
Taiwan, China and Vietnam teas. There were many more participants refusing to bid on China 
and Vietnam teas than Taiwan tea. Those bidding zero for Taiwan tea did so because they did 
not drink tea, and thus did not want to buy it. 
 After auctions, we had participants filling out a questionnaire collecting data on 
purchasing behavior, personal and demographic information. The descriptive statistics for all 
variables used in our econometric estimation will be detailed later. Here we will highlight 
some interesting results. Table 3 presents the responses on factors affecting the participant’s 
food purchase. Results show that the most important factors affecting their food purchase are 
freshness and safety as more than 93% of the respondents ranked them as “very important”. 
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Also more than 92% of the respondents ranked COOL as either somewhat or very important. 
Certification label is also highly ranked. Note that only 47% of the respondents ranked 
“price” as very important. Overall, Taiwanese consumers ranked safety and its related factors 
such COOL or certification more important than price. Table 4 shows that safety is either 
slightly or much more important than freshness if they are the only two factors being 
considered and compared.  
 Figure 1 shows the distribution of frequency on food label checking by the participants 
in three different cities. Results show majority of participants often or always check food 
labels. In Kaoshiung, 59% of participants always checked food labels. In Taipei, 84% of 
participants checked food labels either often or always. Figure 2 shows that Taiwanese 
consumers are not very happy with the government handing food safety as 55% of 
participants were unsatisfied and 9.5% were very unsatisfied with the government’s handling 
of food safety matters. 
 We also asked about the country of origin for the imported food they ever purchased. 
The percentages of ever purchasing food items from Japan and the U.S. are 72% and 57%, 
respectively. Interestingly only 25% and 18% of participants indicated that they have 
purchased food from China and Southeast Asia in the past. It is no wonder without COOL, 
the percentage of Taiwanese consumers knowing they ever purchased food from China is so 
low. Our survey also shows that 75% of respondents were willing to pay for the cost of 
COOL if its implementation would increase food price by 1-5%. 
 
Econometric Analysis 
Test of Affiliations 
In order to understand whether the posted second price would affect the bids in the 
successive trials, we investigate the possibility of the affiliation. It is possible that participants 
might adjust their bid after seeing the posted price which is the second highest bid. 
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Specifically, they may increase their bids if the posted price is higher than their last bids. 
Otherwise, they may decrease the bids. However, if there is no affiliation, there is no 
correlation between the bid adjustment and the price difference between the posted price and 
previous bids. For testing affiliation, we specify the following regression model: 
tititi tPB ,21,10, εβββ ++Δ+=Δ −              
where tiB ,Δ  indicates the bid in trial t minus the bid in trial t-1 and 1, −Δ tiP  denotes the 
posted price in trial t-1 minus the participant i’s bids in trial t-1. Subscript i  and t  
represent individual and trial. The trial variable t is observed with 2, …, 6 because we had six 
trials in each experiment. 
Table 5 shows that the posted price in trial t-1 has a significant and positive effect on 
participant’s bid in trial t. That is, participants would increase their bids for both plum and tea 
if the previously posted price was higher than their previous bids. Since participants would 
adjust their bids during the repeated trials, the dummy variables for trials should be included 
in the bid regression equation auctions. According to Corrigan and Rousu (2006), in order to 
avoid the effect of affiliation, it is better to compute the price premium than the WTP for 
auctioned products. Therefore, we will conduct our econometric estimations for both WTP 
and premium in the next session. 
 
Estimation of Bid and Premium Functions 
 We next attempt to investigate factors affecting the participant’s bidding behavior. Since 
there are zero bids, the dependent variables have values of zero. Therefore, one appropriate 
model is Tobit model. We specify participants’ bids are function of demographic variables, 
purchasing behavior and attitudes, information and risk perception and other experimental 
design variables such as trials and tasting. We will also estimate Taiwan product premium 
functions defined as the difference between bids for Taiwan product and those imported from 
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China or Vietnam. Since the premium may be positive or negative, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) is appropriate for this estimation. 
 Table 6 presents the definitions of all dependent and independent variables used in these 
two econometric models – bid and premium functions. Table 6 also shows the mean and 
standard deviation of each variable from the total sample of 116 participants. The descriptive 
statistics show that the mean bid of Taiwan charcoal plum from all six trials is $55 dollars 
which is much higher than $36 for China plum. The mean bids for Taiwan, China and 
Vietnam oolong teas are $223, 123, and 110, respectively. The average age of the participants 
is 38.67 and males accounts for 51% of the sample. Note that the age distribution and sex 
were controlled by our experimental design. Family size of the participants is 3.84 while 52% 
of participants had household income in 2008 greater than $600,000. 
 Mean statistics also show that 44% of participants mostly or always purchased food 
from traditional markets. Many Taiwanese consumers still prefer traditional markets due to 
their preference for freshness. These markets present huge challenge for enforcing the COOL 
regulations in Taiwan. Table 6 also shows that 80% of participants often or always checked 
food labels. Among the participants, 10% indicated that they received most information from 
packages. With respect to factors affecting participants’ food purchasing, 94% said price is 
somewhat or very important while 98% indicating freshness and safety are somewhat or very 
important. Results also show that 68% of participants were worried about the safety of 
imported foods and only 16% of them were satisfied with the government handling food 
safety matters. 
 After excluding the participants not filling out the survey questionnaire completely and 
carefully, the samples used for Tobit and OLS regressions include 113 participants for 
charcoal-smoked plums and 114 for oolong teas. Since there are six trials, we have sample 
sizes of 678 and 684 for plums and teas, respectively. 
Table 7 shows the regression results on bids and bid premiums. For charcoal-smoked 
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plum, the positive sign of BUYIM means that participants with experiences of buying 
imported food bid more for Taiwan plum. The reason might be that these participants think 
Taiwan produced plum are better than those imported. Negative signs for PRICE imply that a 
participant bid more for China plum if he/she thinks price is an important factor affecting 
their food purchase.  
The variable GOVFS shows that respondents will bid more for Taiwan plum if they are 
satisfied with the government’s handling on food safety matters. Moreover, females bid 
higher for Taiwan plum as the signs for SEX are negative. Because most of main food 
shoppers in Taiwanese households are females, they are more concerned about the issues of 
food safety and family health than male shoppers. FE has negative signs indicating that 
participants who spend more on food are less likely to bid more for Taiwan plum. Positive 
signs for TINC imply that wealthier people tend to bid higher for Taiwan plum.  
 Consider next the Tobit bid equation for China plum; variables PRFR, AGE and TASTE 
are significant. These variables are also significant in the OLS results of the bid premiums for 
Taiwan plum over China plum. These results show that the respondents who think price is 
more important than freshness are less likely to bid high for Taiwan plum. Elder people bid 
higher for China plum (AGE). Elder people should care about their health, but they may be 
more concerned about the attributes of the food products instead of the country of origin. On 
the other hand, young people care more about the country of origin, so they are willing to bid 
higher premium for Taiwan plum. We can also see such result in the premium equation for 
AGE. 
One of our objectives is to examine the impact of product tasting on auction results. 
Positive sign for TASTE in the Tobit China plum equation implies that participants tend to 
bid higher for China plum after tasting. Moreover, tasting put negative effects on the bid 
difference between Taiwan and China plums.  
The variables, BUYSP, INFOF, LACOST, MAR and ZONE3 all have the same sign in 
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both bid equations. Positive signs for BUYSP imply that participants who have experience of 
buying charcoal-smoked plum are willingness to bid more on both plums. Positive signs for 
INFOF imply participants whose food information is mostly from the package tend to bid 
higher on plum. Positive signs for LACOST show that participants who are willing to pay 1% 
to 5% additional cost for implementing the country of origin labeling tend to bid more. 
Moreover, participants who are married bid higher as MAR has positive signs. Nevertheless, 
the positive effect on bids of China plum is more significant. Positive signs for ZONE3 imply 
that Kaohsiung participants tend to bid higher than those in other cities. Although ZONE3 is 
significant and positive on the bids for both Taiwan and China plum, the effect on the Taiwan 
plum is more in magnitude. Additionally, positive signs for MARKET, FRSA and RISK show 
that the participants who mostly or always purchase food in the traditional market, view 
freshness as a more important factor for buying food than safety and think contaminated 
imported food is the food safety issue they care about the most tend to bid more on both 
plums. 
 Besides, FRESH and PRSA are significant and have positive signs for the bid premiums 
for Taiwan plum over China plum. Participants who thinks freshness is an important factor of 
making decision on food buying bid more for Taiwan plum relative to China plum. 
Participants who view price as a more important factor than safety tend to bid higher for 
Taiwan plum. 
Let us examine the Tobit and OLS results for oolong tea.  Premium1 is the bid 
premium for Taiwan tea over China tea and Premium2 in the bid premium for Taiwan tea 
over Vietnam tea. The variables RISK, EDU1, EDU3, FAM10 and FE are all significant for 
the bids of Taiwan tea and the bid premiums of Taiwan tea over China tea. Participants who 
think contaminated imported food as the most important food safety issue (RISK) are willing 
to pay more for Taiwan tea relative to China tea. Both EDU1 and EDU3 have a positive sign, 
but EDU3 has more significant effect on bids. Such results are different from the results of 
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plum and Loureiro and Umberger (2005). The reason might be that there have been so many 
negative reports about tea in recent years. Hence, higher educated participants become 
willing to pay more premiums for Taiwan tea, and the result is the same as Chang (2008). 
Positive signs for FAM10 imply that participants who have children aged less than ten years 
old tend to bid higher for Taiwan tea. Negative signs for FE are the same as the results for 
plum, suggesting that participants with higher food expenditure will bid less for Taiwan tea. 
Furthermore, EDU1, EDU3, FAM10, FE, TRAIL1 and TASTE are significant for bids of 
Taiwan tea and the bid premiums of Taiwan tea over Vietnam tea. The explanations for EDU1, 
EDU3, FAM10 and FE are similar to those provided previously regarding China tea. 
Negative signs for TRAIL1 show that bids and bid premiums are lower in the first trail.  
As to the variable TASTE, the participants tend to bid higher after tasting for both 
Taiwan and China teas, but lower for Vietnam tea although it is not statistically significant. 
As a result, tasting did not affect bid premium over China tea, but significantly higher for the 
premium over Vietnam tea. These results are different from those found for plums. Therefore, 
tasting affects bidding behavior, but the results depend on products. It is important to add 
product tasting for food products such as preserved plums or tea.  
 There are some other variables which have significant effects on bids of oolong tea. The 
variable FRSA shows if respondents place more importance on freshness relative to safety, 
then they will bid less for Taiwan tea relative to China or Vietnam tea. INFOF has a 
significant and positive sign for three teas; that is, participants whose food information is 
from the package bid higher for three teas. Furthermore, respondent who have experience of 
buying tea (BUYTEA) tend to bid lower and those with experience of buying imported food 
(BUYIM) tend to bid higher. Also, respondents who view price more important than 
freshness (PRFR) bid more for China and Vietnam teas.  Positive signs for TINC and 
ZONE3 imply that wealthier people bid more for every tea and the participants living in 
Kaohsiung tend to bid higher for all three teas. 
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 Regarding GOVFS, respondents who are more satisfied with the government’s handling 
of food safety tend to bid higher for Taiwan tea. Older people (AGE) have less willingness to 
bid higher premiums for Taiwan tea as there are positive signs for the bids of China and 
Vietnam teas and negative sign for bid premium for Taiwan tea over China tea. Participants 
like China and Vietnam teas more if they consider price is a very important factor for making 
decision on food purchase (PRICE). Positive signs for MAR show that married people tend to 
bid more for tea. 
Table 8 shows the marginal effects of the variables with estimated significant 
coefficients from Tobit regressions. For a continuous variable, the marginal effect can be 
computed from the Tobit regression results directly (See Wooldridge 2006). For a dummy 
variable, we can compute the difference between )1,0( => jii xyyE  
and )0,0( => jii xyyE .  For AGE, one additional year will raise the WTP by $0.15 for 
Taiwan plum and $0.81 for China plum. As to oolong tea, each additional year of age will 
raise the WTP by $0.93, $2.44 and $1.58 for teas from Taiwan, China and Vietnam, 
respectively. The results for TASTE indicate that after tasting, the bids raise by $4.74 for 
Taiwan plum, $11.54 for China plum, $28.22 for Taiwan tea, and $20.39 for China tea, but 
lower by $1.96 for Vietnam tea. The marginal effects for other dummy variables can be 
interpreted similarly. 
 We also run the same regressions using auction results before and after tasting, i.e., 
Trials 1-3 and Trials 4-6, respectively. We found that the regression results are very similar in 
terms of sign to those using the entire six trials reported in Table 7. Of course the coefficient 
magnitudes changed somewhat with some smaller while others larger. There are fewer 
numbers of significant variables in both regressions. Specifically in Table 7, the total number 
of significant variables excluding TASTE is 104 while there are only 94 and 85 significant 
variables in before tasting and after tasting regressions, respectively. In order to save space 
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these regression results are not presented here. 
 As mentioned previously, in order to avoid the effect of affiliation, it is better to estimate 
the premium rather than the WTP. We compare the estimated bid equations and the premium 
function and find that there are more significant variables in the estimated premium functions 
than the individual bid equations. While there are 17 significant variables in the premium 
equation for plum, only 13 and 12  significant variables for the bid functions for Taiwan and 
China plum, respectively. For teas, the Premium 1 equation (Taiwan vs. China) has 16 
significant variables which are more than 13 significant variables in the bid equations for all 
three teas as well as the Premium 2 equation for Taiwan vs. Vietnam. These results suggest 
that the regression performance for the premium equations is better than those bid functions. 
 Table 9 presents the estimated WTP by products and estimated premiums for Taiwan 
products over those from either China or Vietnam. We present the computation results for all 
trials using Tobit and OLS regressions in Table 7 and the regression results using data before 
and after tasting separately (but not reported in the paper). When computing the % premium 
from the estimated premium, we used the average bid for the base product (such as China 
plum) reported in Tables 1 and 2. For example, for the case of before tasting, the estimated 
premium for Taiwan plum is $24.84. Using the average bid of 29.78 for Trials 1-3 in Table 1, 
we computed the % premium for Taiwan plum to be 83%. Table 9 shows there are substantial 
premiums for Taiwan charcoal-smoked plum and Taiwan tea. The estimated premiums for 
Taiwan oolong tea ranges from 83% - 109% while the estimated premiums for Taiwan 
charcoal-smoked plum ranges from 55% to 66%. These are very high premiums for Taiwan 
products. The results also suggest that tasting affect auction bids. The estimated premiums 
decreased after tasting for Taiwan plum and Taiwan tea over China tea, but increased for 
Taiwan tea over Vietnam tea. We also note that the estimated % premiums from the premium 
equations are higher than those estimated from the individual bid functions.  
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Policy Implications 
 After accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Taiwan’s agriculture sector has 
faced stiff foreign competition. Recently the Taiwan government has attempted to negotiate 
with China to sign an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Even though 
the government has claimed that this will not lift the ban on the imports of 830 agricultural 
products from China. However, many banned agricultural products from China have entered 
into Taiwan market through smuggling or importing via a third country. Oolong tea is the 
case in point, China tea has been imported into Taiwan through Vietnam as Vietnam tea. 
Without COOL, these smuggled and imported products have been sold pretending they are 
domestically produced. In order to reduce the impacts of WTO accession and ECFA, it is 
extremely important to enforce a rigorous traceability system and COOL regulation.  
This study has demonstrated that Taiwanese consumers have a strong preference for 
foods produced domestically. They prefer Taiwan products not because of their patriotism, 
but because of their concerns about food safety. Taiwanese demand for food safety is very 
high especially after the China milk power (melamine) event in September 2008. With high 
premiums for Taiwan food products estimated in this study, many imported food products 
such as preserved fruits and tea from China, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries if 
clearly labeled with COOL will face strong competition with those produced domestically. 
Almost certainly these imported or smuggled products have to reduce their price substantially 
to find buyers. In many cases, Taiwanese consumers simply would not buy products from 
China. Both Taiwanese consumers and food producers will gain substantially with rigorously 
enforced COOL regulations in Taiwan.  
Taiwan does have COOL regulations for both packaged food in 2008 and bulk imported 
food and agricultural products beginning 2010.  Unfortunately, these laws have not been 
forcefully implemented. Food merchants have been earning unlawful profits by not telling 
consumers about the true country of origin of their imported products or by mixing the 
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imported products with domestically produced ones. According to the present government 
COOL regulation, if China oolong tea is mixed with 1% of Taiwan oolong tea, they can be 
sold as Taiwan tea. This type of government regulation is simply unreasonable and it should 
be changed to protect both consumers and domestic producers. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic benefits of COOL regulation by 
estimating the consumer’s WTP for Taiwan product vs. other imported products if clearly 
labeled with their countries of origin. We employed the Vickrey second-price sealed-bid 
auction and conducted auctions in three major cities in Taiwan in 2009. In each experimental 
session, we conducted three repeated trials before product tasting and another three trials after 
tasting. We used charcoal-smoked plums from Taiwan and China and oolong teas from 
Taiwan, China, and Vietnam as auctioned products. These products represent two categories 
of food and agricultural products (preserved fruits and tea) for which the problems of 
deception are most severe. We recruited 116 food shoppers to participate in these auction 
experiments. In addition to auctions, we also collected information on participants’ food 
safety concerns, food purchase behavior, risk perception and demographic characteristics. 
Survey results indicate that auction participants were very concerned about food safety and 
COOL. 
 In order to investigate factors affecting bidding behavior, we estimated Tobit bid models 
for each product and the OLS premium functions. The regression results show that many 
demographic variables, risk perception and experimental design features were significant 
factors affecting participants’ bids and thus premiums for Taiwan products. In particular, 
product tasting was found to affect the participants’ WTP positively or negatively depending 
on products. Specifically, tasting raised bids for Taiwan and China teas, but lowered bids for 
Vietnam tea. Tasting also raised bids for both Taiwan and China plums, though with different 
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magnitudes. Auction results with tasting are more credible because they reflect the real 
market situation. It is also found that the estimated OLS premium equations have more 
significant variables than the individual Tobit bid functions.  
The econometric results show very high premiums for Taiwan products, ranging from 
83% to 109% for tea and 55% to 66% for charcoal-smoked plum. These high premiums were 
caused by food safety concerns, not simply usual quality attributes like those studied by 
Carter, et al. (2006). Note that production areas for preserved fruits and tea have been greatly 
reduced over the last two decades due to the competition from low-price imports. With 
COOL, these high price premiums will undoubtedly increase the domestic supply of 
preserved fruits and tea. However, Taiwanese consumers have such strong preferences for 
food and agricultural products produced domestically. Positive premiums for Taiwan products 
should be sustained in the long run. These findings clearly show that if all foods and 
agricultural products are clearly labeled with their countries of origin, Taiwanese consumers 
and food producers stand to benefit greatly with COOL. The CCOL can promote Taiwan as a 
brand name, Thus it is a great marketing tool as well. The COOL would be one of the best 
instruments to reduce the negative impacts of agricultural trade liberalization under WTO or 
ECFA. 
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Table 1. Average Bids for Charcoal-Smoked Plum  
(Unit: New Taiwan Dollars per 150 Grams) 
Taiwan   China   
Trial 
Mean (MAX, MIN) Mean (MAX, MIN) 
Trial 1 48.50 (230 ,0) 26.47 (180,0) 
Trial 2 52.23 (170,0) 29.54 (150,0) 
Trial 3 55.75 (170,0) 33.32 (150,0) 
Trials 1~3 52.16 (230,0) 29.78 (180,0) 
After Tasting 
Trial 4 55.06 (180,0) 39.51 (150,0) 
Trial 5 57.28 (180,0) 41.32 (200,0) 
Trial 6 58.35 (180,0) 43.12 (250,0) 
Trials 4~6 58.90  (180,0) 41.32 (250,0) 
Trials 1~6 54.53 (230,0) 35.55 (250,0) 
N 696 
 
 
 
Table 2. Average Bids for Oolong Tea  
(Unit: New Taiwan Dollars per 150 Grams) 
Taiwan   China   Vietnam  
Trail 
Mean (MAX, MIN) Mean (MAX, MIN) Mean (MAX, MIN)
Trail 1 185.77 (800,0) 102.42 (400,0) 103.59 (400,0) 
Trail 2 216.25 (650,0) 116.99 (370,0) 114.92 (310,0) 
Trail 3 224.45 (530,5) 118.66 (380,0) 115.88 (350,0) 
Trails 1~3 208.82 (800,0) 112.69 (400,0) 111.47 (400,0) 
After Tasting 
Trail 4 229.28 (550,0) 130.19 (425,0) 108.19 (360,0) 
Trail 5 239.33 (550,0) 133.09 (390,0) 110.31 (320,0) 
Trail 6 242.53 (530,0) 135.96 (365,0) 110.01 (305,0) 
Trails 4~6 237.05 (550,0) 133.08 (425,0) 109.50 (360,0) 
Trails 1~6 222.93 (800,0) 122.88 (425,0) 110.48 (400,0) 
N 696 
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Table 3. Ranking of Factors Affecting Food Purchasing 
 
Factors 
Very 
Unimportant
Somewhat 
Unimportant
Neutrality 
Somewhat 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Price 0.00% 2.59% 3.45% 47.41% 46.55% 
Brand 0.86% 6.90% 7.76% 49.14% 35.34% 
Freshness 1.72% 0.00% 0.00% 5.17% 93.10% 
Safety 1.72% 0.00% 0.00% 1.72% 96.55% 
COOL 1.72% 1.72% 3.45% 40.52% 52.59% 
Nutrition 2.59% 2.59% 12.07% 34.48% 48.28% 
Convenience in 
Using 
1.72% 6.03% 11.21% 45.69% 35.34% 
Convenience in 
Buying 
4.31% 4.31% 12.07% 42.24% 37.07% 
Certification 
Labels 
1.72% 1.72% 5.17% 23.28% 68.10% 
 
 
Table 4. Tradeoff between Freshness and Safety 
Item Number Percentage 
Freshness is much more important than safety 13 11.21% 
Freshness is slightly more important than safety 8 6.90% 
Safety is slightly more important than freshness 44 37.93% 
Safety is much more important than Freshness 51 43.97% 
N 116 
 
Table 5. Affiliation Test Results (OLS) 
Charcoal-Smoked Plum Oolong Tea 
Variable 
Taiwan China Taiwan China Vietnam 
Constant -16.05*** -5.86* -8.7 -11.25* -19.24*** 
 (3.51) (3.02) (8.17) (6.44) (5.59) 
P 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
t 0.67 0.05 -3.22** -2.17** -1.78* 
 (0.51) (0.43) (1.36) (1.09) (0.96) 
N 565 565 570 570 570 
Notes: N represents the number of observations. The symbols***,** and * denote that the 
variables are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are 
estimated standard errors. 
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Table 6. Variable Definition and Coding 
Variable Definition and Coding Mean S.D.
Dependent Variables 
SPt Bids of charcoal-smoked plum produced in Taiwan (NT$) 54.53 36.52
SPc Bids of charcoal-smoked plum imported from China (NT$). 35.55 32.93
OTt Bids of oolong tea produced in Taiwan (NT$). 222.93 120.86
OTc Bids of oolong tea imported from China (NT$). 122.88 84.71
OTv Bids of oolong tea imported from Vietnam (NT$). 110.48 74.38
Trial Variables 
TRIAL 1 1 if first trial; 0 otherwise.   0.17 0.37
TRIAL 2 1 if second trial; 0 otherwise.   0.17 0.37
TRIAL 3 1 if third trial; 0 otherwise.   0.17 0.37
TRIAL 4 1 if fourth trial; 0 otherwise.   0.17 0.37
TRIAL 5 1 if fifth trial; 0 otherwise. 0.17 0.37
TRIAL 6 1 if sixth trial; 0 otherwise. 0.17 0.37
TASTE 1 if auction was done after tasting; 0 otherwise. 0.50 0.50
Demographic Variables 
AGE Age of respondents as of 2009. 38.67 11.06
SEX 1 if male, 0 if female. 0.51 0.50
MAR 1 if married; 0 otherwise. 0.46 0.50
EDU1 1 if primary or secondary school; 0 otherwise. 0.23 0.42
EDU2 1 if high school; 0 otherwise. 0.34 0.48
EDU3 1 if college, university or above; 0 otherwise. 0.43 0.50
FAMSIZE Number of household members. 3.84 1.19
FAM10 1 if household has children under age 10; 0 otherwise. 0.32 0.47
FE 1 if household food expenditure per week＞3,000; 0.28 0.45
 0 otherwise.   
INC 1 if personal income per month＞$50,000; 0 otherwise. 0.10 0.31
TINC 1 if household income in 2008＞$600,000; 0 otherwise. 0.52 0.50
BMI 1 if BMI＜24; 0 otherwise. 0.61 0.49
ZONE1 1 if respondent is living in Taipei; 0 otherwise. 0.33 0.47
ZONE2 1 if respondent is living in Taichung; 0 otherwise. 0.32 0.47
ZONE3 1 if respondent is living in Kaohsiung; 0 otherwise. 0.34 0.48
Purchasing Behavior and Attitude 
MARKET 1 if mostly or always purchasing in the traditional market; 0 otherwise. 0.44 0.5000
CHECK 1 if often or always check the food labeling; 0 otherwise. 0.80 0.40
BUYIM 1 if ever buy imported food; 0 otherwise. 0.94 0.24
  30
Table 6. (Continued) 
BUYSP 1 if ever buy charcoal-smoked plum; 0 otherwise. 0.90 0.30
BUYTEA  1 if ever buy oolong tea; 0 otherwise. 0.85 0.36
Information and Perception 
INFOF 1 if food information is from package; 0 otherwise. 0.10 0.31
INFOC 1 if very well or somewhat informed about COOL; 0 otherwise. 0.67 0.47
PRICE 1 if price is somewhat or very important; 0 otherwise. 0.94 0.24
BRAND 1 if brand is somewhat or very important; 0 otherwise. 0.84 0.36
FRESH 1 if freshness is somewhat or very important; 0 otherwise. 0.98 0.13
SAFETY 1 if safety is somewhat or very important; 0 otherwise. 0.98 0.13
COOL 1 if COOL is somewhat or very important; 0 otherwise. 0.93 0.26
NUTRI 1 if nutrition is somewhat or very important; 0 otherwise. 0.83 0.38
USECCON 1 if convenience for using is somewhat or very important; 0 otherwise. 0.81 0.40
BUYCON 1 if convenience for buying is somewhat or very important; 0 otherwise. 0.79 0.41
CAS 1 if certification label (like CAS) is somewhat or very important;  0.91 0.28
 0 otherwise.   
PRFR 1 if price is slightly or much more important than freshness; 0 otherwise. 0.12 0.33
PRSA 1 if price is slightly or much more important than safety; 0 otherwise. 0.04 0.20
PRCO 1 if price is slightly or much more important than COOL; 0 otherwise. 0.32 0.47
FRSA 1 if freshness is slightly or much more important than safety;  0.18 0.39
 0 otherwise.   
PRCAS 1 if price is slightly or much more important than CAS; 0 otherwise. 0.27 0.45
LACOST 1 if respondent is willing to pay 1%~ 5% premiums for COOL; 0.75 0.44
 0 otherwise.   
RISK 1 if respondent worries about safety of imported food; 0.68 0.47
 0 otherwise.   
GOVFS 1 if respondent is satisfied with government handling on food safety;  0.16 0.36
 0 otherwise.   
TRACE 1 if respondent believes in the traceability of label; 0 otherwise.  0.86 0.35
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Table 7. Regression Results on Bids and Premiums 
Charcoal-Smoked Plum Oolong Tea 
Taiwan China Premium Taiwan China Vietnam Premium1 Premium2Variable 
(Tobit) (Tobit) (OLS) (Tobit) (Tobit) (Tobit) (OLS) (OLS) 
Constant -18.78  -69.48*** 22.12** -24.14 -131.07*** -13.89 89.35** -1.82  
 (14.76) (15.22) (10.76) (42.77) (34.78) (29.71) (38.29) (32.47) 
BUYSP 22.40*** 30.61*** -3.89  _ _ _ _ _ 
 (4.85) (5.08) (3.51)      
BUYTEA _ _ _ 13.20 -32.90*** -24.34*** 44.31*** 35.31*** 
    (12.02) (9.73) (8.35) (10.83) (9.19) 
MARKET -4.70  -11.06*** 3.89* 1.40  0.51  -6.41  -1.36  3.46  
 (3.03) (3.09) (2.21) (9.16) (7.39) (6.38) (8.27) (7.01) 
INFOF 28.07*** 31.25*** 1.57  45.89*** 70.67*** 51.52*** -16.89  -5.37  
 (5.06) (5.10) (3.70) (15.42) (12.43) (10.71) (13.88) (11.78) 
CHECK -1.08  -6.21  3.23  7.10  -4.51  0.92  10.82  4.41  
 (3.77) (3.85) (2.75) (11.40) (9.22) (7.93) (10.24) (8.68) 
BUYIM 11.71* -8.21  20.45*** 121.18*** 68.97*** 26.40* 50.52*** 85.73*** 
 (6.73) (6.82) (4.86) (20.10) (16.13) (13.82) (17.83) (15.12) 
PRICE -10.91*** 1.05  -10.23*** -24.20*** 14.23* 12.81** -33.84*** -33.90***
 (3.08) (3.13) (2.25) (9.12) (7.36) (6.35) (8.24) (6.99) 
FRESH 8.00  -4.78  12.49*** -65.66*** -11.86 -45.56*** -57.72*** -22.51  
 (5.94) (6.01) (4.35) (17.97) (14.42) (12.47) (16.23) (13.76) 
PRFR -2.42  8.22** -7.26*** -2.25 39.54*** 26.74*** -35.24*** -26.46***
 (3.38) (3.47) (2.48) (10.24) (8.27) (7.12) (9.24) (7.84) 
PRSA 5.17  1.41  5.57** -17.18 -13.00 -30.80*** -3.93  10.12  
 (3.81) (3.88) (2.78) (11.56) (9.34) (8.07) (10.42) (8.84) 
PRCO 9.52*** 4.33  4.50* -2.94 3.27  -1.63  -7.40  -1.89  
 (3.65) (3.75) (2.67) (10.99) (8.86) (7.63) (9.93) (8.42) 
FRSA 1.02  15.42*** -10.39*** 2.01  28.82*** 22.54*** -20.63*** -18.36***
 (2.96) (3.04) (2.16) (8.78) (7.12) (6.13) (7.92) (6.72) 
LACOST 11.38*** 16.04*** -3.25  15.48 12.13  7.59  3.14  6.97  
 (3.37) (3.45) (2.46) (10.15) (8.19) (7.05) (9.17) (7.78) 
RISK -0.16  -11.34*** 7.74*** 44.18*** -12.29 35.20*** 53.73*** 11.81  
 (3.57) (3.67) (2.61) (10.81) (8.70) (7.52) (9.76) (8.28) 
GOVFS 8.02* 4.27  5.48* 18.95 2.19  1.85  21.70* 19.80** 
  (4.15) (4.23) (3.03) (12.59) (10.16) (8.73) (11.37) (9.64) 
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Table7. (Continued) 
Charcoal-Smoked Plum Oolong Tea 
Taiwan China Premium Taiwan China Vietnam Premium1 Premium2Variable 
(Tobit) (Tobit) (OLS) (Tobit) (Tobit) (Tobit) (OLS) (OLS) 
AGE 0.16  1.02*** -0.54*** 0.98  2.74*** 1.75*** -1.39** -0.66  
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) (0.63) (0.51) (0.44) (0.57) (0.48) 
SEX -10.11*** 0.24  -11.10*** 6.30  -0.05 4.79  5.77  3.15  
 (3.11) (3.19) (2.26) (9.34) (7.58) (6.52) (8.44) (7.16) 
MAR 9.06* 18.93*** -4.53 9.09  51.05*** 18.42* -36.75*** -9.32  
 (4.64) (4.79) (3.38) (13.96) (11.34) (9.73) (12.62) (10.70) 
EDU1 8.20* 5.08  2.82  34.93*** 9.58  7.55  22.66* 25.08**
 (4.41) (4.48) (3.22) (12.94) (10.42) (8.99) (11.66) (9.89) 
EDU3 -3.34  -1.63  -3.85 48.91*** 0.17  10.44 45.62*** 35.77***
 (3.71) (3.80) (2.71) (11.19) (9.06) (7.82) (10.11) (8.57) 
FAM10 3.27  5.13  0.30  22.45** 4.59  1.92  17.27** 19.75***
 (3.22) (3.30) (2.35) (9.58) (7.75) (6.67) (8.66) (7.35) 
FE -8.74*** 1.26  -8.08*** -58.75*** -5.17 -9.05 -52.25*** -48.75***
 (3.34) (3.40) (2.43) (10.05) (8.12) (7.01) (9.08) (7.70) 
TINC 13.97*** 5.74  8.74*** 55.06*** 37.43*** 19.07*** 17.91* 34.00**
 (3.45) (3.51) (2.52) (10.46) (8.44) (7.29) (9.45) (8.01) 
ZONE3 16.97*** 13.96*** 3.48* 53.30*** 39.65*** 40.62*** 12.28  13.18**
 (2.90) (2.96) (2.11) (8.60) (6.95) (5.99) (7.77) (6.59) 
TRIAL1 -5.46  -6.20  -0.54 -35.77*** -17.34* -13.39 -19.12* -22.91**
 (3.91) (4.06) (2.86) (11.80) (9.56) (8.21) (10.63) (9.02) 
TRIAL4 -2.83  -2.99  4.43E-03 -11.92 -4.33 -2.24 -7.53  -9.89  
 (3.92) (3.96) (2.86) (11.78) (9.50) (8.20) (10.63) (9.02) 
TASTE 3.18  13.22*** -7.11*** 20.87** 18.18** -6.22 3.73  26.23***
  (3.20) (3.26) (2.33) (9.62) (7.77) (6.69) (8.68) (7.36) 
R-squared 0.22  0.25  0.20  0.30  0.25  0.23  0.25  0.29  
N 678 678 678 684 684 684 684 684 
Notes: The symbols***,** and * denote that the variables are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. Blank space indicates that the variable is not applicable. N is 
the number of observation. 
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Table 8. Marginal Effects for Charcoal-Smoked Plum and Oolong Tea 
Unit of  Charcoal-Smoked Plum Oolong Tea 
Variable 
Measurement Taiwan China Taiwan China Vietnam
BUYSP 1 or 0 21.00  18.69  _ _ _ 
BUYTEA 1 or 0 _ _ 9.64  -31.82  -18.44 
MARKET 1 or 0 -2.26  -3.07  -0.64  7.95  2.76  
INFOF 1 or 0 20.12  19.50  -18.45  36.52  15.42 
CHECK 1 or 0 -2.13  -4.38  7.09  0.15  -0.87 
BUYIM 1 or 0 9.90  -5.23  137.75 57.25  35.88 
PRICE 1 or 0 -10.29  0.06  -25.76  1.80  5.14  
FRESH 1 or 0 0.05  -12.84  -44.85  -15.81  -32.82 
PRFR 1 or 0 -5.03  -2.27  0.82  22.35  19.49 
PRSA 1 or 0 -0.37  -1.48  -6.23  3.90  -4.33 
PRCO 1 or 0 8.10  7.88  2.03  25.04  8.56  
FRSA 1 or 0 0.59  4.65  8.39  14.27  12.27 
LACOST 1 or 0 8.97  10.34  10.05  7.12  1.64  
RISK 1 or 0 -0.41  -8.79  48.09  3.94  28.50 
GOVFS 1 or 0 0.42  -3.42  -0.31  -16.57  -15.58 
AGE Years  0.15  0.81  0.93  2.44  1.58  
SEX 1 or 0 -5.00  1.01  19.64  15.83  13.12 
MAR 1 or 0 8.88  7.02  21.26  23.39  17.32 
EDU1 1 or 0 -5.95  -2.85  -32.52  -24.74  -13.84 
EDU3 1 or 0 0.24  -2.91  53.00  22.75  16.30 
FAM10 1 or 0 2.96  4.07  21.20  4.08  1.73  
FE 1 or 0 1.70  2.20  -17.93  8.99  2.03  
TINC 1 or 0 8.21  2.01  63.36  29.55  23.48 
ZONE3 1 or 0 17.90  15.16  57.31  45.01  41.98 
TRIAL1 1 or 0 -7.23  -10.90  -44.60  -24.55  -8.27 
TRIAL4 1 or 0 0.64  4.76  7.62  8.77  -2.75 
TASTE 1 or 0 4.74  11.54  28.22  20.39  -1.96 
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Table 9. Estimated Willingness to Pay and Premiums 
Charcoal-Smoked Plum Oolong Tea 
Taiwan China Premium Taiwan China Vietnam Premium1 Premium2Trial Item 
(TW) (CH) (TW-CH) (TW) (CH) (V) (TW-CH) (TW-V)
Mean 
(NT$) 
54.07 30.21 24.84 212.9 113.33 113.24 105.84 105.9 
S.D. (17.12) (15.71) (8.48) (63.23) (41.40) (34.92) (44.29) (38.04) 
Before 
Tasting 
% 
Premium 
 79% 83%  88% 88% 94% 95% 
Mean 
(NT$) 
57.41 42.13 22.46 239.62 133.47 110.72 115.59 133.88 
S.D. (15.96) (17.47) (10.44) (63.75) (42.82) (38.76) (41.88) (41.88) 
After 
Tasting 
% 
Premium 
 36% 54%  80% 116% 87% 122% 
Mean 
(NT$) 
55.67 36 23.49 226.23 123.5 111.64 112.64 120.1 
S.D. (16.08) (16.20) (9.34) (63.79) (42.62) (34.87) (42.61) (41.27) All Trials 
% 
Premium 
 55% 66%  83% 103% 92% 109% 
N   678 684 
Notes: N is the number of the observations. TW, CH and V represent Taiwan, China and Vietnam. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Frequency on Checking Food Labels 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Level of Satisfaction with Government on Food Safety Handling 
 
